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Chong M. Lau and Vimala Amirthalingam
ABSTRACT
Research on how performance measurement systems affect employees’
perceptions of workplace fairness is important. As organizations often
rely on their performance measurement systems to communicate infor-
mation to their employees, it is useful to ascertain if and how the
developments of performance measurement systems that are far more
comprehensive than traditional financial systems affect employees’ per-
ceptions of informational fairness through the information communicated
to employees. Informational fairness refers to employees’ perceptions of
workplace fairness that is based on the amount and the truthfulness
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of information that organizations provide to their employees. Based on a
sample of managers from manufacturing organizations, the Partial Least
Square results indicate that comprehensive performance measurement
systems (comprehensive PMS) have a significant direct effect on job-
relevant information. They also indicate that comprehensive PMS have
an indirect effect on informational fairness via job-relevant information.
In contrast, systems that are based on financial measures have no signifi-
cant effects on job-relevant information and informational fairness. These
results demonstrate how comprehensive PMS (through the communica-
tion of a greater amount of job-relevant information) can be used to
engender employees’ perceptions of high workplace fairness.
Keywords: Comprehensive performance measurement systems;
financial measures; job-relevant information; informational fairness
INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the informational effects of comprehensive perfor-
mance measurement systems (comprehensive PMS) and those of systems
based primarily on financial performance measures on (1) the extent of job-
relevant information generated and (2) the levels of employees’ perceptions
of informational fairness. The purposes are to ascertain (1) if the use of
comprehensive PMS vis-a-vis financial measures systems as performance
measurement and evaluation systems is perceived as informationally fair or
unfair by employees and (2) if such informational fairness perceptions are
influenced by the extent of job-relevant information engendered by compre-
hensive PMS and systems based on financial performance measures, respec-
tively. Comprehensive PMS are systems with a diverse set of measures
comprising both financial and nonfinancial information to provide a broad
range of performance information about different areas and different
dimensions of a unit performance. They provide a variety of information
that covers critical areas of each unit’s operations (Burney & Widener,
2007; Chenhall, 2005; Hall, 2008).
The popularity of multidimensional performance measurement systems
(e.g., Balanced Scorecard, Tableau de bord and performance hierarchies) in
recent period has led to an increased interest and an increased use of per-
formance measurement systems that are comprehensive for measuring and
evaluating organizational performance. There have also been suggestions


































that the increased reliance on such comprehensive PMS for organizational
performance measurement may be more effective if such systems are also
linked to employee performance measurement and evaluation (Burney,
Henle, & Widener, 2009; Burney & Widener, 2007; Hall, 2008; Kaplan &
Norton, 1992, 1996). Following such suggestions, there is a need for
research on the behavioral implications in the use of comprehensive PMS.
Several key questions need to be addressed empirically. First, would
employees perceive the use of comprehensive PMS as fair or unfair from an
informational perspective? Second, why would employees perceive the use
of comprehensive PMS as fair or unfair from an informational perspective?
Is it because comprehensive PMS engender a high extent of job-relevant
information? Third, are the effects of comprehensive PMS on employees’
perceptions of informational fairness indirect via job-relevant information?
Finally, are the effects of comprehensive PMS on employees’ perceptions
of informational fairness different from those arising from the use of
systems that rely primarily on financial performance measures?
Our study focuses on if and how performance measurement systems
(comprehensive PMS vis-à-vis financial performance measurement systems)
affect employee outcomes and perceptions. It contributes to the perfor-
mance measurement systems literature in several ways. First, the study of
such issues is important from a practical perspective as how employee
performance is measured and evaluated may have profound effects on
employees’ reactions to their supervisors and their organizations responsible
for the design and implementation of the processes used to measure and
evaluate performance. Employee performance evaluation is important to
employees. Employees are concerned with their performance evaluations as
their remuneration, promotions, and career prospects may be closely related
to the performance measurements and appraisals they receive from their
superiors. In this regard, employees are concerned with the systems and the
criteria (comprehensive PMS or financial measures) used by their superiors
to measure and evaluate their performance.
Second, from a theoretical perspective, empirical results from prior man-
agement accounting studies have indicated that performance measurement
systems and performance measures are related to employees’ outcomes, per-
ceptions, and behavior. Hall’s (2008) results indicate that comprehensive
PMS is positively related to both role clarity and psychological empower-
ment. Burney and Widener (2007) found that comprehensive PMS are
related to job-relevant information. Burney et al. (2009) provide empirical
evidence to support a positive relationship between comprehensive PMS
and procedural fairness. These studies provide important systematic


































empirical evidence to support the contention that performance measure-
ment systems have important behavioral implications. Further research to
extend such research findings may provide additional important insights
into how performance measurement systems affect employees’ outcomes
and perceptions.
Third, the study of fairness of performance measurement systems and
performance measures is important. Fairness in performance evaluation
may be regarded as a key determinant of employees’ reactions to perfor-
mance evaluation. Consequently, it is important for organizations to know
if the use of comprehensive PMS (vis-a-vis systems which rely only on
financial measures) is perceived as fair or unfair by employees. While issues
of performance evaluation and the determination of compensations have
been the focus of much management accounting research since the seminal
work of Hopwwod (1972), earlier management accounting studies have not
paid much attention to the effects of performance measurement systems on
employees’ fairness perceptions. Since the mid-1990s, there has been
increasing interest in fairness issues in management accounting studies.
These include studies by Magner and Welker (1994), Lindquist, (1995),
Libby (1999, 2001), Lau and Lim (2002), Wentzel (2002), Burney et al.
(2009), and Hartmann and Slapničar (2009).
While there has been increasing interest by management accounting
researchers on fairness issues, there are concerns that several central ques-
tions remain either unaddressed or unclear. Of particular concern is the
question of whether the different dimensions of fairness are properly identi-
fied and dealt with appropriately (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Ng,
Porter, & Wesson, 2001; Greenberg, 1993). Prior management accounting
studies have generally conceptualized fairness as procedural fairness and
distributive fairness. Procedural fairness, in turn, has generally been con-
ceptualized as a single construct. However, procedural fairness may not be
a single construct but may comprise several dimensions including structural
procedural fairness, interpersonal fairness and informational fairness
(Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993). While researchers in other disciplines
(e.g., management and organizational behavior) have been increasingly
concerned with research which fail to distinguish among the different
dimensions of procedural fairness (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001),
the notion that procedural fairness may not be a single construct have gen-
erally been given little attention by prior management accounting research.
Colquitt (2001, p. 387) suggests that “an inability to separate purportedly
distinct constructs at a measurement level leads to confusion regarding the
nomological network of those constructs … Moreover, the practice of


































merging interactional (informational) and procedural (structural) fairness
prevents researchers from uncovering important differences between the
constructs … procedural (structural) and interactional (informational)
justice affect other variables through different intervening mechanisms …
Merging the two forms of justice … creates practical problems as well.
Should organizations devote more resources to improving the structural
aspects of procedures or training leaders to act in an interactionally fair
manner? Such answers cannot be answered at present.” (Parentheses
added). Hence, identifying the different dimensions of procedural fairness
and selecting the most relevant dimension of fairness for inclusion in the
model facilitate the development of a more refined model and more power-
ful predictions of the relationships among the variables under investigation
(Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg &
Colquitt, 2005).
Our study compares the effects of comprehensive PMS with those of
financial measures on employees’ reactions to performance measurement
systems. Since an organization’s performance measurement system is a cru-
cial means by which an organization communicates job-relevant informa-
tion to its employees, the performance measurement system literature
suggests that a comprehensive PMS is likely to communicate more job-
relevant information to employees than financial measures (Chenhall, 2005;
Hall, 2008; Kaplan, 1984; Johnson & Kaplan, 1991). Additionally, since a
comprehensive PMS encompasses a much broader range of information
(including both nonfinancial and financial measures, linkages across the
value chain, and with organizational strategies) (Burney & Widener, 2007;
Chenhall, 2005; Hall, 2008), the information derived from such a system is
likely to be a more accurate and truthful reflection of situations than if a
much narrower performance measurement system is used. Consequently,
the use of a comprehensive PMS is likely is likely to result in (1) a greater
extent of job-relevant information provided to employees and (2) percep-
tions by employees that the information from the performance information
system is truthful. These consequences of a comprehensive PMS are consis-
tent with employees’ perceptions of informational fairness. Informational
fairness refers to employees’ perceptions of workplace fairness that is based
on the amount and the truthfulness of information that organizations pro-
vide to their employees. The organizational justice literature suggests that
people’s perceptions of how fair are the procedures are influenced by not
only by the structures (technical aspects) of the procedures, but also how
people are treated by others. The Group Value Theory, in particular, sug-
gests that when people are made to feel that they are accepted and valued


































by the group they belong, they are likely to perceive procedures (that are
used to make decisions) as fair, regardless of whether the decision made is
favorable or unfavorable to them (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001;
Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Lind & Tyler, 1988). In the context of infor-
mational fairness, when employees are provided with explanations and
information by their organization on why and how decisions are made, and
such information and explanations are truthful, employees are likely to
perceive the organization’s procedures as fair because they perceive such
actions on the part of the organization as a sign that the organization
values them and accepts them as an integral part of the organization.
Researchers have generally labeled this form of organizational fairness as
informational fairness (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg,
1993; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). As the consequences of a comprehen-
sive PMS in providing more job-relevant information are consistent with
employees’ perceptions of informational fairness (the provision of explana-
tions and truthful information), informational fairness is chosen as the
dimension of fairness for our study.
The study of informational fairness is important. While there has been
some research in management accounting on issues pertaining to distribu-
tive and procedural fairness, no prior management accounting studies have
investigated the effects of performance measurement systems on employee
perceptions of informational fairness or the mechanism by which perfor-
mance measurement systems influences the extent of job-relevant informa-
tion which, in turn, influences employees’ perceptions of informational
fairness (Burney et al., 2009; Hartmann & Slapničar, 2009; Lau & Lim,
2002; Libby, 1999, 2001; Lindquist, 1995; Magner & Welker, 1994; Wentzel,
2002). Hence, our study may be the first to provide systematic empirical
evidence on the questions of whether and how performance measurement
systems affect employees’ perceptions of informational fairness. It is also
the first empirical study undertaken to compare the effects of comprehensive
PMS with those of financial performance measures on informational fair-
ness. A systematic investigation of the effects of financial measures vis-a-vis
comprehensive PMS may provide valuable insight into the extent and how
the two categories of distinct performance measurement systems affect
employees’ perceptions of fairness from an informational perspective.
Fig. 1 presents the model used in this study. It proposes that the use of
comprehensive PMS is significantly related to the extent of job-relevant
information. Job-relevant information is, in turn, related to employees’ per-
ceptions of informational fairness. Financial measures are also included in
the model. The expectation is that financial measures are not significantly


































related to job-relevant information. Hence, while job-relevant information
is expected to mediate the relationship between comprehensive PMS and
informational fairness, this expectation is not extended to the relationship
between financial measures and informational fairness.
The following section discusses the theoretical justification for the
hypotheses. This is followed by a presentation of the research method used,
including sample selection and measurement of variables. The results of the
data analysis are then presented. The final section discusses the findings,
conclusions, and limitations.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Performance Measures (Comprehensive PMS vis-a-vis Financial Measures)
and Job-Relevant Information
Our study compares systematically the effects of financial measures with
those of comprehensive PMS. Organizations have traditionally relied on
financial measures as the main measures for performance measurement and
evaluation. Financial measures such as revenues, costs, budget, and budget
variances are used in many organizations as measures of organizational
and employee performance. The financial budgets are generally a key








Fig. 1. Conceptual Model.


































play a crucial role in the planning, control, performance measurement, and
evaluation of organizational functions and activities.
In contrast, a comprehensive PMS encompasses a broader range of
performance measures (including both nonfinancial and financial measures)
across the value chain and are linked to corporate and strategic business
units’ strategies. This concept of comprehensive PMS is based on that
developed by Hall (2008). Hall (2008, p. 141) defines comprehensive PMS
as systems that include “a more diverse set of performance measures that
are linked to the strategy of the firm and provide information about parts
of the value chain.”
The following discussion provides the justification for our expectation
that the use of a comprehensive PMS is likely to be associated with a
greater extent of job-relevant information than the use of a performance
measurement system that relies solely on financial measures. Kren (1992)
considers job-relevant information as decision-facilitating information and
describes it as information that helps managers to improve his or her action
choice through better-informed effort. According to him, employees with
job-relevant information are able to function more effectively as they are in
a better position to make more effective selection of appropriate courses of
action.
Based on Hall’s (2008) concept, a comprehensive PMS is different from
financial measures in three important aspects. First, a comprehensive PMS
is broader than financial measures as it may include both nonfinancial
measures and financial measures. Second, the measures are based on the
organization’s value chain instead of a functional area or a department.
Third, they are linked to the organization’s strategy. Due to these inherent
characteristics, a comprehensive PMS is likely to provide employees with a
higher extent of job-relevant information than a system that relies solely on
financial measures. As a comprehensive PMS relies on a diverse set of per-
formance measures, comprising both financial and nonfinancial measures
that may apply across the value chain, it is likely to provide information
across different areas, different dimensions and different components of
each unit’s operations. Second, as a comprehensive PMS is usually also
linked to the organization’s and the unit’s strategies, it is able to provide
information to operating employees on how the various aspects of their
and their units’ performance are linked to the overall organizational strat-
egy and the overall organizational performance. Hall (2008, p. 144) argues
that comprehensive PMS may contain more information because: “… there
are several important characteristics of comprehensive performance mea-
surement systems including providing a broad set of measures related to


































the important parts of the organization, the integration of measures with
strategy and valued organizational outcomes and the integration of mea-
sures across functional boundaries and the value chain … as such a more
comprehensive performance measurement system is one that provides more
comprehensive performance information to managers, i.e., measures that
fully describe the strategic business unit’s operations and link to strategy
and across the value chain” (emphasis added). A comprehensive PMS may
therefore assist employees to gain insights into the various key aspects of
their unit’s operations and strategies.
The use of a comprehensive PMS for performance measurement may
also create an environment that leads to the acquisition of more job-
relevant information. Because a comprehensive PMS may cover different
phases and different areas of a unit’s operations, there is likely to be more
discussion, more interest and more involvement by employees in all areas
of the unit’s operations. There may also be more exchange of ideas between
superiors and subordinates and among peers and fellow employees. These
are likely to lead to a greater understanding of how different parts of a unit
operate and are intricately linked together (Fisher, 1992; Hall, 2008).
Because a comprehensive PMS may also focuses employees’ attention on
decisions and behavior that contribute to the overall organizational strat-
egy, employees may increase the time spent on evaluating and absorbing
the information from a diverse set of performance measures. Employees
are required to spend time thinking about how the different components of
their units and the different dimensions of tasks in their units are interre-
lated both within the unit, other departments as well with the overall orga-
nizational strategy and objectives.
Moreover, because a comprehensive PMS is less likely to be constrained
by the annual financial reporting cycle, information on performance can be
both short term and long term. Consequently, more job-relevant informa-
tion is available when both long-term and short-term considerations are
incorporated into the performance measurement system (Fisher, 1992;
Kaplan & Norton, 1996). Burney and Widener (2007, p. 46) explain as fol-
lows: “A strategic (comprehensive) performance measurement system clari-
fies and communicate strategic objectives … it may deliver to the manager a
message that while controlling costs is important, so are customer satisfac-
tion and quality. This communication informs the manager that she cannot
shirk her responsibilities in either quality or satisfaction to save on costs.”
There is therefore more information to direct manager attention to both the
short-term financial objectives (cost control) as well as the longer-term
objectives such as meeting the long-term strategies of the organization.


































As a comprehensive PMS may also include nonfinancial measures, it is
likely to be more effective in promoting a broader and longer-term outlook
among managers. Chenhall (2005, p. 399) states that “the association
between strategic performance measurement systems and performance
depends on the type of organizational performance being considered, with
some evidence suggesting that strategic performance measurement systems
are associated with medium to long-term performance” (emphasis added).
Ittner, Larcker, and Randall (2003, p. 717) note that “one approach to
strategic performance measurement is supplementing traditional financial
measures with a diverse mix of nonfinancial measures that are expected to
capture key strategic performance dimensions that are not accurately
reflected in short-term accounting measures” (emphasis added). The results
of their study indicate that comprehensive PMS are associated with longer-
term returns (such as 1 and 3-year stock returns) but not with short-term
accounting return (such as return on assets and sales growth). Based on
these results, they conclude that “the performance implications of strategic
performance measurement systems are more likely to be captured in
forward-looking stock market measures than in short-term, historical
accounting measures” (Ittner et al., 2003, p. 738) (emphasis added). In their
discussion of the Balanced Scorecard framework, a form of comprehensive
PMS, Kaplan and Norton (1996, p. 18) argue that “The Balanced scorecard
is a new framework for integrating measures derived from strategy. While
retaining financial measures of past performance, the Balanced Scorecard
introduces the drivers of future financial performance … Management pro-
cesses built around the scorecard enable the organization to become
aligned and focused on implementing the long-term strategy.” Kaplan
(1984, p. 414) similarly suggests that “the option to include nonfinancial
measures in the firm planning and control system will be more unfamiliar,
more uncertain … It will require them (managers and management accoun-
tants) to understand those factors that are most critical to the company’s
long-term success”(parenthesis and emphasis added).
In contrast, because financial performance measures, including the finan-
cial budgets, are generally linked to the annual financial reporting cycle, they
are generally much narrower and more constrained than comprehensive
PMS. First, as financial measures are usually linked to the annual reporting
cycle, they are generally short-term measures of 1 year or less. Performance
information of a longer term than 1 year is generally not captured and not
reported to the operating units when only financial measures are used for
performance measurement and evaluation. In this regard, Fisher (p. 31)
notes that: “as managers know … financial measures reflect the results of


































past decisions, not the actionable steps needed for surviving in today’s
competitive environment.” Bol (2008, p. 4) note that “accounting measures,
frequently used objective performance measures, are, by nature, backward-
looking. Consequently, they do not accurately reflect the effects of employees’
actions or decisions on future firm value … Placing high incentive weight on
backward-looking objective measures will give rational agents a short-term
focus which will likely destroy long-term company value.” Based on their
review of the state of management accounting practices in the United States,
Johnson and Kaplan (1991, p. 3) observe that: “today’s management
accounting systems provide a misleading target for managerial attention and
fail to provide the relevant set of measures that appropriately reflect the tech-
nology, the products, the processes, and the competitive environment in
which the organization operates.” They attribute this to the short-term focus
of financial performance measures and explain as follows: “Today’s manage-
ment accounting information, driven by the procedures and cycle of the
organization’s financial reporting system… with increased emphasis on meet-
ing quarterly or annual earnings targets … focus(es) narrowly on producing a
monthly earnings report … Managers’ horizons contract to the short-term
cycle of the monthly profit and loss statement … Typical … cost accounting
systems are helpful neither for product costing nor for operational cost
control. The rationalization for their production and existence seems only for
the periodic, usually monthly, financial reports prepared for senior manage-
ment …. the problem likely arise from an excessive focus on achieving short-
term financial performance” (emphasis added).
Similarly, because of the need to comply with accounting standards and
regulation, financial measures must necessarily be based on objective evi-
dence, based on historical costs, and cover only what can be measured in
monetary terms. Much job-relevant information such as product defect
rates, number of innovation, number of new customers acquired, and
employee satisfaction rate are not reported by performance measurement
systems comprising only financial measures. Moreover, the need to convert
all performance into financial terms may result in errors and loss of infor-
mation because of the translation process. Finally, because financial mea-
sures are ultimately expressed in monetary term which can be aggregated,
performance measurements based on financial measures are generally quite
aggregated, resulting in a loss of job-relevant information. Financial mea-
sures such as variable overhead spending variance and variable overhead
efficiency variance are not only too technical and complicating for operat-
ing employees to comprehend, they are also too aggregated. They may be
caused by a very diverse range of items of overhead as well as by many


































employees from across several operating units. Hence, they may not be
helpful to operating employees in their task completion as they do not
reflect the causes of the variances nor are they able to pinpoint who are
responsible for the variances With respect to the variances arising from the
typical standard cost systems in the companies included in his study, Fisher
(1992, p. 37) observes that: “one of the major weaknesses was the perceived
belief that a variance is not actionable at the operating level. The various
departments of the plant had difficulty in interpreting a variance and
tracing it to a specific problem. Since an unfavorable variance may have
multiple causes, causality is often difficult to determine.” In order to over-
come such limitations of financial measures, he suggests that performance
measurement systems which are broadened to include nonfinancial mea-
sures are not only “more directly traceable to the strategies of the firm” but
may also provide the information which operating level employees could
use to act upon. He cites examples of situations where “a drop in quality
was quickly determined using nonfinancial measures, so remedial steps
could quickly be taken to solve the problem” and when a firm has poor
response time to customer order, “the nonfinancial measures of on-time
performance would directly address this issue.”
From an agency perspective, financial measures are likely to be outcome-
based metrics (Fisher, 1992; Hoque, Mia, & Alam, 2001; Kaplan, 1984;
Vaivio, 1999). In this regard, Fisher (1992, p. 31) note as follows: “conven-
tional reports about financial performance of a business  whether they are
internal reports (e.g., budget or variance report) or external reports … are
much like the scoreboard at a baseball game. A scoreboard tells a player
whether he is winning or losing the game, but it tells him little about what
he is doing right or wrong … As managers know … financial measures
reflect the results of past decisions, not the actionable steps needed for sur-
viving in today’s competitive environment.” Agency theory suggests that
information including the extent of job-relevant information is likely to be
reduced with outcome-based metrics such as financial performance mea-
sures (Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory
further suggests that the agent’s opportunism (moral hazard and adverse
selection) can be managed by (1) the information system and (2) the form
of contract between the agent and the principal. With regard to the infor-
mation system, when the principal has information from the information
system to verify the agent’s behavior, the agent is more likely to refrain
from acting against the principal’s interest. With regard to the form of
contract, outcome-based contracts may be effective in curbing agents’ oppor-
tunism than behavior-based contracts. According to Eisenhardt (1989),


































when a contract is outcome based, risk is effectively transferred from the
principal to the agent. Consequently, the agent is more likely to behave in
the interest of the principal because the rewards for both the agent and the
principal depend on the same actions.
Since an outcome-based contract such as those based on financial mea-
sures may curb the agent’s opportunism, there will be less need for the prin-
cipal to rely on a sophisticated (comprehensive) information system to
monitor the agent’s behavior. Conversely, when the contact is behavior
based, the principal may need to invest in a more sophisticated (compre-
hensive) information system to monitor the agent’s behavior. Both
Eisenhardt (1989) and Conlon and Parks (1988) found that information
systems were negatively related to outcome-based evaluation systems. There
is therefore research evidence to support the contention that the level of
sophistication (comprehensiveness) of the information system is negatively
associated with the outcome-based contracts such as those based primarily
on financial metrics. It is therefore reasonable to expect that when
employee performance evaluation is based on outcome-based metrics such
as financial measures (Fisher, 1992; Hoque et al., 2001; Kaplan & Norton,
1992; Vaivio, 1999), the performance measurement system is likely to be
less comprehensive and, hence, contains less job-relevant information. In
contrast, when employee performance evaluation is based on comprehensive
performance measures, the performance measurement system is likely to be
more comprehensive and, hence, contains more job-relevant information.
Based on the above discussion, the expectation is that performance mea-
surement systems that are comprehensive are likely to be associated with a
high extent of job-relevant information. In contrast, performance measure-
ment systems based only on financial measures may not be associated with
a high extent of job-relevant information. We therefore propose:
H1. The use of performance measurement systems that are comprehen-
sive is positively related to the extent of job-relevant information.
H2. The use of performance measurement systems that rely only on
financial measures is not related to the extent of job-relevant information.
Job-Relevant Information and Employees’ Perceptions of
Informational Fairness
This section discusses the theoretical justification for the expectation that
job-relevant information may be positively associated with employees’


































perception of fairness, specifically, their perceptions of informational fair-
ness. Employees’ perceptions of fairness in the workplace are important
(Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Hence, research on
the effects of performance measurement systems on employees’ perceptions
of fairness contributes to the performance management system literature
(Burney et al., 2009; Hartmann & Slapničar, 2009; Lau & Moser, 2008).
However, since there are different dimensions of organizational fairness, it
is important for research on organizational fairness to specify which dimen-
sion of fairness is being studied. Otherwise, the theoretical arguments and
results may be confusing.
The organizational justice literature contends that fairness is not a single
construct. There are several dimensions of fairness. First, there is the distinc-
tion between distributive fairness and procedural fairness (Colquitt et al.,
2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Procedural fairness, in
turn, comprises three dimensions, namely, structural procedural fairness,
interpersonal fairness, and informational fairness (Bies & Moag, 1986;
Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg &
Colquitt, 2005; Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry, 1994). Distributive fairness refers
to the fairness of outcomes people received or the decisions that have been
made. In other words, distributive fairness refers to how fair are the out-
comes or how fair are the decisions made (Adams, 1965). In contrast, proce-
dural fairness (comprising structural procedural fairness, interpersonal
fairness and informational fairness) is not directed at the outcomes or the
decisions made. Instead, it relates to how fair are the procedures or pro-
cesses used to make allocations and decisions. First, structural procedural
fairness refers to the perceived fairness of the technical characteristics of
procedures such as the degree of process control, accuracy of information,
consistency in application of procedures across individuals and time,
correctibility of incorrect decisions, representativeness and bias suppression
(Leventhal, 1980). Second, interpersonal fairness refers to the degree of
politeness, respect, and propriety by which organizations and supervisors
treat employees (Greenberg, 1993). Third, informational fairness is based
on the amount of information and the truthfulness of such information that
organizations and supervisors are willing to provide to employees (Bies &
Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro
et al., 1994).
As there are four dimensions of fairness, it is important to identify the
specific dimension of fairness that the independent variables investigated in
our study are theoretically associated with. Our study investigates the rela-
tionships between comprehensive PMS vis-a-vis financial measures and


































employees’ perceptions of fairness. It is highly unlikely that the use of com-
prehensive PMS vis-à-vis financial measures and job-relevant information
can be theoretically linked to all four dimensions of fairness because an
argument that is made for one dimension of fairness (e.g., distributive fair-
ness) may be contrary to another dimension of fairness (e.g., informational
fairness). As the theoretical justifications for the relationships between
job-relevant information and distributive fairness, structural procedural
fairness and interpersonal fairness are unclear, these three dimensions of
fairness are not included in this research. Consequently, our study focuses
only on informational fairness. We base our selection of informational
fairness on the following premises.
Organizational justice theories suggest that people’s judgments of fair-
ness are influenced by (1) instrumental effects and (2) noninstrumental
effects. Instrumental effects refer to people’s perceptions of fairness that
are based on how procedures fulfill their self-interests (Colquitt et al., 2001;
Lind & Tyler, 1988; Lindquist, 1995; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The Self-
Interest Theory developed by Lind and Tyler (1988) suggests that people
perceive procedures that fulfill their self-interests in the long term as fair
because these procedures get them what they want (even if they may have
to compromise in the short term). In contrast, noninstrumental effects of
fairness refer to people’s perceptions of fairness based on how they are trea-
ted by others in the groups to which they belong to. The Group Value
Theory developed by Lind and Tyler (1988) suggests that humans are
affiliative creatures and want to be accepted by the groups (collectives) they
belong to. As they want to belong to groups, they are likely to perceive
greater fairness in those groups’ procedures that make them feel that they
are accepted and valued by the groups they belong to. In other words, pro-
cedures with characteristics and attributes which make an individual feels
that he or she is valued and accepted by the group are perceived as fair.
In contrast, procedures without any characteristics and attributes to make
a group member feels that he or she is valued and accepted by the group
are perceived as unfair (Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005;
Greenberg, 1993; Lind & Tyler, 1988).
Informational fairness, the dimension of fairness of our study, is consis-
tent with the non-instrumental effects of fairness. It was first introduced by
Greenberg (1993) and is based on the Group Value Theory of organiza-
tional justice developed by Lind and Tyler (1988). According to Greenberg
(1993), informational fairness is engendered by two specific aspects of infor-
mation communicated by group leaders to individual group members.
The first aspect is the amount of information and explanations group leaders


































are willing to disclose to individual group members for key decisions
made about the group. The second aspect relates to the truthfulness of such
information and explanations provided to individual group members.
Colquitt (2001, p. 390) similarly states that justifications or explanations
(explaining the basis of decisions made) and truthfulness (an authority
figure being candid and not engaging in deception) as the two key determi-
nants of employees’ perceptions of informational fairness. The disclosure of
a greater amount and more truthful information and explanations indicates
openness and transparency on the parts of the group leaders. It also
indicates that group leaders are taking individual group members into their
confidence by reducing secrecy and dishonesty (Colquitt, 2001). Finally,
it demonstrates the willingness of group leaders to involve and engage indi-
vidual group members in the key activities and decision making of the
group. In such situation, individual group members are likely to feel that
they are valued and accepted by their group leaders and their group.
Consequently, they are likely to perceive their group’s procedures as infor-
mationally fair.
Our research investigates the effects of comprehensive PMS vis-a-vis
financial measures on informational fairness via job-relevant information.
Hence, it is necessary for our research to ascertain if the provision of a
greater extent of job-relevant information from the use of a comprehensive
PMS (as hypothesized in hypotheses H1) is in accordance with the condi-
tions of high informational fairness. Based on the concept of informational
fairness as developed in the organizational justice literature (Bies & Moag,
1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005;
Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro et al., 1994), informational fairness is perceived
as high under these two conditions: (1) when supervisors are willing to
disclose information (explanations and justifications) to employees for key
decisions made and (2) when supervisors are truthful in providing such
information.
Hence, to assess informational fairness, the criteria are (1) the amount of
information provided to employees and (2) the extent of truthfulness in the
information provided to employees. With regard to the first condition (a
greater extent of information), our study hypothesizes that comprehensive
PMS are associated with a greater amount of job-relevant information than
systems based only financial measures (see H1 and H2 in previous section).
In this section, we hypothesize that a greater amount of job-relevant infor-
mation, in turn, is likely to be associated with a higher level of informational
fairness because more job-relevant information means the provision of
more information and explanations to employees. First, job-relevant


































information, through the provision of task-related information and feed-
back, enables employees to understand their tasks, their responsibilities and
how their jobs are relate to other aspects of their unit and their organiza-
tion. Kren (1992, p. 512) suggests that job-relevant information “provides
the manager with a better understanding of decision alternatives and actions
needed to reach objectives.” Hence, job-relevant information improves
employees’ understanding of their tasks and roles and ultimately their orga-
nization including a better understanding of the decision-making processes
of their organization. With a better understanding of the organizational
decision-making processes, employees are likely to be in a better position to
understand and appreciate the rationales and justifications on why and how
decisions that affect them are made. Job-relevant information may lead to
greater employees’ involvement in the organizational decision-making
processes. Job-relevant information not only facilitates effective task com-
pletion and performance, it also enhances employees’ understanding of the
various aspects of their tasks, their responsibilities, their work situations,
and their work environment. Employees in such situations are likely to be in
a far better position to participate and be involved in key aspects of the
organizations’ affairs and decision making. Organizations and supervisors
are also likely to be more willing to involve employees in decision making
when employees are well informed and knowledgeable of their tasks and
work situations. Employees, who are involved in their organizations’
decision-making processes because of their greater understanding of their
jobs, may experience a greater sense of acceptance by their superiors and
their organization.
More importantly, the provision of more job-relevant information to
employees conveys to the employees the message that their organization
and their supervisors value them and accept them as an integral part of the
group (organization). As discussed previously, the organizational fairness
literature suggests that humans are affiliative creatures and want to belong
to groups (collectives) (Lind & Tyler, 1988). They want to feel “accepted”
and “valued” by the group (Colquitt, 2001, p. 391). However, not everyone
is accepted and valued by the group. How do employees in an organization
know if they are accepted and valued by the organization (group) they
belong to? Colquitt (2001, p. 391) argues that the amount of information
provided by organization reflects “the extent to which a person feels he or
she is valued by the collective.” The organizational fairness literature sug-
gests that the involvement of employees in key decision making requires
the disclosure of more information by the organization to those taking part
in the decision making. It also suggests that the organization and group


































leaders generally only allow people whom they accept and value to partici-
pate in the key decision making of the group (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt,
2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Greenberg, 1993;
Shapiro et al., 1994). Consequently, when the organization and the super-
iors disclose more information to employees, they signal to the employees
that they (the organization and the superiors) want the employees to parti-
cipate in the key decisions of the organization. It also follows that if an
organization and the superiors want employees to participate in key deci-
sions, the organization and the superiors accept and values the employees.
In this regard, Colquitt (2001, p. 395) note that: “in the know connotes
being in the in-group”. Hence, when more job-relevant information is
provided to employees (through a comprehensive PMS), it conveys to
employees that the organization accepts them and values them as an impor-
tant component of the organization and wants to involve them in its key
decision making. Consequently employees’ perceptions of informational
fairness are likely to be high.
The second condition of informational fairness is truthfulness in the
information provided. Colquitt (2001, p. 390) notes that truthfulness refers
to “an authority figure being candid and not engaging in deception.” The
disclosure of confidential and truthful information by the group and group lea-
ders to an individual is therefore a signal that the individual is valued and
accepted by the group. In the context of our research, when the organization
(group) and the superiors (group leaders), through comprehensive PMS,
provide more job-relevant information to their employees, they are sending
a clear message to the employees that they (the organizations and the super-
iors) are being truthful because they are taking their employees into their
confidence by disclosing confidential information to them. Moreover, by
engendering a greater understanding of tasks and work situations among
employees, job-relevant information exposes the organizational decision-
making processes to scrutiny and hence reduces dishonesty and secrecy.
Employees with a high extent of job-relevant information are likely to be
able to detect dishonest and untruthful justifications and explanations for
decisions made for their units. They are therefore likely to be in a better
position to expect and ask for truthful information and justifications.
Hence, in situations where job-relevant information is high, supervisors are
likely to find it very difficult to be deceitful, dishonest and not transparent.
Employees in such situations are likely to perceive that they have been
adequately informed with truthful explanations on how decisions are made.
In summary, the discussion above suggests that when an organization
(through a comprehensive PMS) provides a greater amount of job-relevant


































information to its employees, the information is likely to facilitate greater
employees’ involvement in organizational decision making and better
employees’ appreciation of the rationales and justifications for key deci-
sions made. This is likely to engender feelings among employees that their
organization is providing them with a high extent of truthful information
and explanations about their organization. These outcomes support
the expectation that job-relevant information is an effective means to pro-
mote communication and truthfulness between the organization and its
employees. These effects of job-relevant information are likely to engender
a feeling of well-being among the employees including a belief that their
organization is benevolent. More importantly, they may engender a feeling
among the employees that their organization and their superiors value
them and accept them as an integral and important part of the organiza-
tion. Consequently, they are likely to perceive a high level of fairness in
their organization’s procedures. When perceptions of fairness are brought
about by employees’ feelings of acceptance by their organization through
the provision of more truthful information, the form of fairness is labeled
as informational fairness (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt
et al., 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005; Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro et al.,
1994). Accordingly, we propose:
H3. Job-relevant information is positively related to employees’ percep-
tions of informational fairness.
Job-Relevant Information as an Intervening Variable between
Comprehensive PMS and Informational Fairness
The previous section of the paper proposes in H1 that comprehensive PMS
is positively related to job-relevant information. H3 further suggests that
job-relevant information is, in turn, positively related to employees’ percep-
tions of informational fairness. These relationships suggest that the effects of
comprehensive PMS on informational fairness are indirect via job-relevant
information. In contrast, the expectation is that financial measures are not
significantly related to job-relevant information (see H2). Hence, the rela-
tionship between financial measures and informational fairness is not
expected to be mediated by job-relevant information. We therefore propose:
H4. The relationship between comprehensive PMS and employees’
perceptions of informational fairness is indirect and is mediated by
job-relevant information.


































H5. The relationship between financial performance measures and
employees’ perceptions of informational fairness is not mediated by
job-relevant information.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample Selection and Data Collection
A mail questionnaire survey was used to collect the data. The participants
were selected from organizations listed in the Kompass Australia database.
In order to provide some degree of control for industry effects, only organi-
zations from the manufacturing sector were included in the study.
Similarly, in order to provide some degree of control over the size of orga-
nizations, the selection criteria of (1) a minimum of 100 employees and
(2) an annual turnover of more than Australian $10 million, were used.
Based on these criteria, 653 manufacturing organizations qualified for
selection. In order to keep the sample of organizations to a manageable
size, a selection interval of 4 was used to randomly select a total of 163
organizations (25% of the total qualified organizations).
All 163 organizations were contacted by telephone calls to seek their
assistance to participate in the research. Only 121 organizations were will-
ing to participate. As it would be impracticable for the organizations to
provide us with a full list of their employees, the organizations were
requested to provide the researchers with the names of no more than six
employees from generally middle-level management employees with some
supervisory responsibilities in the production and marketing functions.
The names of a total of 500 employees were obtained from the 121
organizations.
A questionnaire together with a covering letter (explaining the purpose
of the research and assuring confidentiality of responses) and a prepaid
reply envelope to the researchers were mailed to each selected employees. A
follow-up reminder letter was sent to each participant two weeks after the
initial mailing of the questionnaire set. Forty-seven unopened questionnaire
sets were returned to the researchers as return to sender stating that the
selected participants were no longer working in the organizations or
that the addresses were incorrect. One hundred and eight completed
responses were received. Four were incomplete. This results in 104 useable
responses.


































Based on the number of responses received and the number of question-
naire mailed and received by the intended participants, the response rate is
approximately 24%. This response rate is comparable with some prior
management accounting studies (e.g., Baines & Langfield-Smith, 2003; Hall,
2008) involving surveys of departmental supervisors in Australian manufac-
turing organizations.
In order to test for nonresponse bias, the approach suggested by
Oppenheim (2001) whereby the responses of the early respondents were
compared with those of the late respondents was undertaken. No signifi-
cant differences were found for any of the variables investigated between
the early responses and late responses. These results provide some assur-
ance that nonresponses bias may not be an issue with the data set.
The demographic data indicate that the average respondent in the sam-
ple had held his or her position for an average of 12 years, was responsible
for an average of 49 employees and was, on average, 47 years of age. Most
respondents (87%) held at least a vocational, tertiary, or professional
qualification. These demographic data provide some assurance that the
respondents were generally well-qualified and experienced employees with
important responsibilities in their organizations.
Measurement of Variables
Comprehensive PMS
The variable comprehensive PMS is measured by the instrument developed
by Hall (2008). The instrument comprises nine items. Five of the items
relate to the extent to which the respondents’ organizational PMS are able
to provide a broad and diverse range of information on different areas and
different dimensions of the respondents’ units of operation. The other four
items are based on the instrument developed by Chenhall (2005) which
relate to the extent to which the organizational PMS are able to link the
unit performance to the organizational strategies and long-term goals. For
example, respondents are asked to rate on a seven-point Likert-scale on
whether they agree or disagree if their organizational PMS (1) provides a
diverse set of measures related to key performance areas of their work
units; (2) provides a broad range of performance information about differ-
ent areas of their units; and (3) provides consistent and reinforcing links
between the current operating performance of their units and the long-term
strategies of their organization. Hall (2008) tested and found satisfactory
psychometric properties for the instrument.



































This variable is measured by a five-item instrument developed by Lau and
Moser (2008). The question asks “When your superior is evaluating your
performance, how much importance do you think he or she attaches to the
following items?” Participants are required to respond to a seven-point
Likert scale ranging from “1  never important” to “7  always impor-
tant.” The financial measures items are: (1) My ability to meet my budget;
(2) my ability to avoid unfavorable budget variances; (3) My ability to
meet or better budgeted costs or sales; (4) My ability to achieve budgeted
cost reduction or budgeted sales growth; and (5) My ability to achieve
financial targets.
Job-Relevant Information
This variable is measured by the instrument developed by Kren (1992)
with the objective to ascertain the extent of information the respondents
perceive that they have for job-related decisions. The three items include
whether the respondents (1) are clear about what is necessary to perform
their jobs well, (2) have adequate information to make optimal decisions,
and (3) are able to obtain strategic information. This instrument has since
been used by several management accounting studies (e.g., Burney &
Widener, 2007; Leach-Lopez, Stammerjohan, & McNair, 2007). The instru-
ment was tested and found to have satisfactory psychometric properties by
Kren (1992) and the subsequent studies that used this instrument.
Informational Fairness
This variable is measured by the instrument developed by Colquitt (2001).
The instrument comprises five items derived from prior studies on organi-
zational fairness including Bies and Moag (1986) and Shapiro et al. (1994).
The first item is on truthfulness and seeks to ascertain the extent to which
the respondents’ superiors have been candid in their communication. The
other four items are on justification and explanation. They include the
extent to which the respondents’ superiors have provided explanations to
procedures, explained procedures thoroughly, communicate details in a
timely manner, and tailored communication to individual’s specific needs.
The instrument was tested thoroughly by Colquit (2001) including compari-
sons of multiple a-prior factor structures (one-factor, two-factor, three-
factor, and four-factor conceptualization), and examination of outcomes
associations with the fairness constructs to demonstrate predictive validity.
The instrument was also subjected to two independent studies to test for
construct validity.



































Structural equation modeling based on the partial least squares (PLS)
method is used for hypothesis testing in this study. This technique has been
used extensively in recent management accounting studies (Hall, 2008;
Hartmann & Slapničar, 2009). The approach estimates the structural model
using an iterative OLS regression-like procedure, which calculates the var-
iance of the latent and/or observed-dependent variables by minimizing their
residual variances, using minimal assumptions about the data distribution
and sample size thus making it appropriate for the purposes of this study
(Wold, 1985).
Measurement Model
PLS uses a measurement model and a structural model. The measurement
model explains the links between observed items and latent variables. The
structural model assesses relations between latent constructs. While both
the measurement and structural models are estimated simultaneously in
PLS, interpretation of the results is a two-step process. First, the measure-
ment model ascertains if the constructs’ measures are reliable and valid
before assessing the nature of the relationships among the constructs. The
analysis and interpretation of the measurement model include analyzing
individual item reliability, construct reliability, and convergent and discri-
minant validity for all reflective constructs.
Results of the initial measurement model for analyzing individual item
reliability are analyzed first. Individual item reliability occurs when an item
has factor loading of 0.5 and above on its respective construct (Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). The factor loadings results for all the indicators of the
variables as presented in Table 1 show that all are above 0.5. They range
between 0.70 and 0.97. These results indicate that individual item reliability
is satisfactory for the variables in the study.
In terms of construct reliability, the rules of Fornell and Larcker (1981)
based on the measures of composite reliability and Cronbach alpha are
used to assess the reliability of each latent variable. Ideally, the composite
reliability score should exceed 0.7 (Vandenbosch, 1996) and the Cronbach
alpha score should exceed 0.8 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) for each latent
variable. The results in Table 1 indicate that the composite reliability scores
are all in excess of 0.9. These are all well above 0.7 threshold. The
Cronbach alpha scores are also all in excess of the 0.8 threshold, ranging


































between 0.858 and 0.95. These results indicate acceptable construct reliabil-
ity for the variables used in the model (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994;
Vandenbosch, 1996).
With regard to validity, both convergent and discriminant validity for
the constructs are assessed based on the average variance extracted (AVE).
The AVE represents the average variance shared between a construct and
its indicators (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The threshold of AVE for conver-
gent validity is 0.5 and above (Vandenbosch, 1996). The results in Table 1
indicate that the AVEs for all variables are greater than 0.5 ranging
between 0.672 and 0.779. These results indicate that convergent validity
exists for all constructs (Chin, 1998).
Table 1. Estimation of the Measurement Model Parameters (n= 104).






CPMS1 0.732 13.334 0.001 0.950 0.958 0.719
CPMS2 0.711 10.371 0.001
CPMS3 0.886 30.189 0.001
CPMS4 0.872 32.084 0.001
CPMS5 0.886 30.535 0.001
CPMS6 0.907 39.133 0.001
CPMS7 0.910 39.499 0.001
CPMS8 0.806 20.267 0.001
CPMS9 0.890 36.725 0.001
Financial measures
FIN1 0.960 4.224 0.001 0.930 0.931 0.732
FIN2 0.837 3.934 0.001
FIN3 0.795 3.571 0.001
FIN4 0.870 4.670 0.001
FIN5 0.804 3.907 0.001
Job-relevant information
JRI1 0.871 30.091 0.001 0.858 0.913 0.779
JRI2 0.902 32.272 0.001
JRI3 0.874 36.921 0.001
Informational fairness
IFF1 0.700 8.509 0.001 0.874 0.910 0.672
IFF2 0.896 41.560 0.001
IFF3 0.908 45.010 0.001
IFF4 0.869 32.378 0.001
IFF5 0.698 8.589 0.001


































Discriminant validity of the constructs is assessed next. Two tests
are undertaken. First, discriminant validity of constructs is found to be
adequate as shown by the square root of the AVE statistics (diagonal AVE
values in Table 3) compared with the correlations among the latent
variables. These results indicate that each construct shares more variance
with its own indicators than with other constructs (Fornell & Larcker,
1981). Second, when assessing discriminant validity, each indicator’s cross-
loadings onto other constructs should be negligible. Cross loadings are cal-
culated based on correlating the component scores of each latent variable
with all the other items (Chin, 1998). The results in Table 2 indicate that the
loading of each item within its corresponding latent construct is higher than
those of items from other latent constructs both horizontally and vertically.
Overall, based on the results in Tables 1, 2, and 3, the PLS measurement
model indicates satisfactory individual item reliability, construct reliability,
convergent validity, and discriminant validity for the variables of this study.
Table 2. Discriminant Validity Test: Cross Loadings.
Construct Indicators CPMS FIN JRI IFF
Comprehensive PMS CPMS1 0.732 0.378 0.385 0.408
CPMS2 0.711 0.296 0.242 0.287
CPMS3 0.886 0.345 0.361 0.354
CPMS4 0.872 0.345 0.420 0.465
CPMS5 0.886 0.346 0.418 0.365
CPMS6 0.907 0.305 0.399 0.334
CPMS7 0.910 0.334 0.407 0.295
CPMS8 0.806 0.277 0.296 0.334
CPMS9 0.890 0.344 0.339 0.345
Financial measures FIN1 0.359 0.960 0.252 0.147
FIN2 0.360 0.837 0.028 0.045
FIN3 0.358 0.795 0.033 −0.026
FIN4 0.362 0.840 0.115 0.073
FIN5 0.314 0.804 0.038 0.020
Job-relevant information JRI1 0.386 0.181 0.871 0.543
JRI2 0.393 0.073 0.902 0.433
JRI3 0.375 0.239 0.874 0.526
Informational fairness IFF1 0.302 0.064 0.424 0.700
IFF2 0.403 0.146 0.524 0.896
IFF3 0.358 0.095 0.535 0.908
IFF4 0.338 0.099 0.509 0.869
IFF5 0.340 0.047 0.308 0.698



































The structural model results are presented and interpreted next. The struc-
tural model is evaluated by testing (1) the coefficient of determination (R2)
and (2) the strength and direction of the path coefficients (Urbach &
Ahlemann, 2010). The R2 is a prediction-oriented measure. It calculates the
relationship between a latent construct’s explained variance and its total
variance (Chin, 1998; Ringle & Hansmann, 2004). A high (low) R2 indicates
high (low) predictive power for the structural model. The results in Fig. 2
show that the R2 for job-relevant information as explained by comprehen-
sive PMS and financial measures is 19%. The R2 for informational fairness
as explained by financial measures, Comprehensive PMS (CPMS), and job-
relevant information is 37%. These results indicate that the use of financial
performance measures and the use of comprehensive PMS are able to
explain 19% and 37% of the variation of job-relevant information and
informational fairness, respectively. These indicate relatively strong R2
(Cohen, 1988; Ringle & Hansmann, 2004) and compare favorably with
other management accounting studies of around 15% (e.g., Emsle, 2005;
Kren, 1992; Mia & Chenhall, 1994). Higher R2 are not expected because
employee job-relevant information and informational fairness are likely to
be affected by many other variables apart from those included in our model.
Next, the structural model is evaluated by testing the strength and direc-
tion of the path coefficients (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). Statistical signifi-
cance of the parameter estimates is based on a bootstrap procedure with
1,000 replacements (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Hartmann & Slapničar,
2009). Fig. 2 presents the path coefficients of the structural model. They
indicate the following. First, with regard to comprehensive PMS, the path
between comprehensive PMS and job-relevant information is positive and
highly significant (est.= 0.427, p< 0.01). These results provide support for
Table 3. Discriminant Validity Coefficients and Square Root of AVE.
CPMS FIN JRI IFF
CPMS 0.848
FIN 0.392 0.856
JRI 0.436 0.190 0.882
IFF 0.424 0.115 0.571 0.820
CPMS=Comprehensive performance measurement systems, FIN=Financial measures,
JRI= Job-relevant information, IFF= Informational fairness.


































H1 which states that the use of PMS that are comprehensive is positively
related to job-relevant information. Second, the results indicate that job-
relevant information is, in turn, positively and significantly related to infor-
mational fairness (est.= 0.478, p< 0.01). These results support H3 which
states that job-relevant information is positively related to informational
fairness.
The results for financial measures are analyzed next. H2 states that
the use of performance measurement systems that rely only on financial
measures is not related to the extent of job-relevant information. The
results in Fig. 2 show that financial measures are not significantly related
to job-relevant information (est.= 0.023, p> 0.1). H2 is therefore also
supported.
H4 states that the relationship between comprehensive PMS and infor-
mational fairness is indirect and is mediated by job-relevant information.
In contrast, H5 states that the effects of financial measures on informa-
tional fairness are not mediated by job-relevant information. In order to
test for these two hypotheses, it is necessary to ascertain the direct effects
and indirect effects of comprehensive PMS and financial measures on infor-
mational fairness. First, based on path coefficients presented in Fig. 2, the
direct and indirect effects of comprehensive PMS are ascertained as follows
and presented in Table 4:
Indirect effect of via job-relevant information= 0.427× 0.478= 0.204














–0.072 ns *   = p < 0.05 (2-tailed)
** = p < 0.001 (2-tailed)
ns = p > 0.1
Fig. 2. Comprehensive Performance Measurement Systems (CPMS), Financial
Measures, Job-Relevant Information and Informational Fairness: Path Coefficients.
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In order to ascertain if the indirect effect of comprehensive PMS on
informational fairness is meaningful, the criterion suggested by Pedhazur
(1982) and Bartol (1983) is used. These two researchers suggest that for an
indirect effect to be meaningful, the absolute amount of the effect (the pro-
duct of the standardized path coefficients) needs to be at least 0.05. Since
the indirect effect of comprehensive PMS on informational fairness as com-
puted above is 0.244 and is way above the meaningful threshold of 0.05,
the indirect effect is meaningful.
A second test is undertaken to ascertain if job-relevant information
mediates the relationship between comprehensive PMS and informational
fairness. Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177) suggest that for mediation to
occur, three conditions must hold. First, the independent variable must be
significantly related to the dependent variable. Second, the independent
variable must significantly affect the mediating variable. Finally, the med-
iating variable must, in turn, significantly affect the dependent variable.
Our results for comprehensive PMS provide support for all three condi-
tions. First, comprehensive PMS is significantly related to informational
fairness. The zero-order correlation between comprehensive PMS and
informational fairness is 0.424 (p< 0.01). Second, comprehensive PMS
significantly affect job-relevant information (est.= 0.427, p< 0.1; see
Fig. 2). Third, job-relevant information is, in turn, significantly related to
informational fairness (est.= 0.478; p< 0.01; see Fig. 2). These results pro-
vide support for H4 that job-relevant information mediates the relationship
between comprehensive PMS and informational fairness. In order to ascer-
tain if the mediation is full or partial, the criterion suggested by Baron and
Kenny (1986) is used. This criterion states that if a significant relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable becomes
insignificant after controlling for the indirect effect, the mediating variable
is deemed to have a full-mediating effect. However, if a significant relation-
ship between the independent variable and the dependent variable remains
significant after the indirect effect has been partialled out, the mediating
variable is deemed to have a partial mediating effect. For our study, the
results indicate that the zero-order correlation for the relationship between
comprehensive PMS and informational fairness is significant (p< 0.01).
The results in Fig. 2 also indicate that the path coefficient for the path
between comprehensive PMS and informational fairness is still significant
(est.= 0.244, p< 0.05) after the indirect effect via job-relevant information
have been controlled for. Hence, the mediation is only partial.
Overall, the results for comprehensive PMS suggest the following.
First, comprehensive PMS significantly affect employees’ perceptions of


































informational fairness (est.= 0.425, p< 0.01). Second, these effects are both
direct (direct effect= 0.244, p< 0.05) and indirect via job-relevant informa-
tion (indirect effect= 0.204). Third, job-relevant information partially med-
iates the relationship between comprehensive PMS and employees’
perceptions of informational fairness. H4 is therefore partially supported.
With regard to the relationship among financial measures, job-relevant
information and informational fairness, the results are as follows. First, the
zero-order correlation between financial measures and informational fair-
ness is not significant (est.= 0.114, p> 0.1). Second, based on path coeffi-
cients presented in Fig. 2, the direct and indirect effect of financial
measures on informational fairness are ascertained as follows:
Indirect effect of via job-relevant information= 0.023 × 0.478= 0.011
Direct effect of financial measures on informational fairness=− 0.072
These results indicate that financial measures are not significantly related
to informational fairness (est.= 0.0.114, p> 0.1). Second, since the absolute
amount of the indirect effect is only 0.011, which is way below the meaning-
ful threshold of 0.05, the indirect effect is not meaningful (Bartol, 1983;
Pedhazur, 1982). Moreover, the relationship between financial measures
and job-relevant information is also not significant (est.=−0.072, p> 0.1;
see Fig. 2). Hence, the relationship between financial measures and infor-
mational fairness is not mediated by job-relevant information. H5, which
states that the relationship between financial measures and informational
fairness is not mediated by job-relevant information, is therefore supported.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the relationships between performance measurement
systems (comprehensive PMS and financial measures) and employees’ per-
ceptions of fairness, specifically, informational fairness. Survey responses
from 104 employees with supervisory responsibilities are used. SEM-PLS is
used to analyze the data.
The research has several purposes. The first is to investigate the issue of
fairness associated with performance measurement systems. It addresses
the question of whether comprehensive PMS affect employees’ perceptions
of fairness. The second purpose is to examine the mechanism by which
comprehensive PMS affect employees’ perceptions of fairness. Specifically,
it attempts to answer the question of whether the effects of comprehensive


































PMS on employees’ perceptions of fairness are direct or indirect via job-
relevant information. The third purpose is to develop a more refined model
to investigate employees’ fairness perceptions. Prior management account-
ing research that focuses on fairness issues has generally conceptualized
procedural fairness as a single construct. There have been suggestions that
procedural fairness may comprise several dimensions. Our research focuses
on the dimension of fairness, namely, informational fairness, that is, most
appropriate for the chosen independent (comprehensive PMS) variable and
the chosen intervening variable (job-relevant information) in order to pro-
duce a more refined model for investigation. Importantly, the last purpose
is to ascertain if the effects on as well as the mechanism by which compre-
hensive PMS affect employees’ perceptions of informational fairness are
similar or different from those of financial measures. This will assist organi-
zations in their decisions on the choice of performance measurement
systems.
The results are as follows. With regards to comprehensive PMS, the
results indicate that comprehensive PMS are positively and significantly
related to informational fairness. Second, comprehensive PMS are also
positively and significantly related to job-relevant information. Third, job-
relevant information is, in turn, positively and significantly related to infor-
mational fairness. With respect to financial measures, the results indicate
that financial measures have no significant effects on job-relevant informa-
tion. They also do not have any significant effect on employees’ perceptions
of informational fairness.
Based on these results, it is possible to conclude as follows. Comprehen-
sive PMS have two beneficial employee outcomes. First, they engender
job-relevant information. Second, they enhance employees’ perceptions of
informational fairness. With respect to the mechanism by which perfor-
mance measurement systems influence informational fairness, comprehen-
sive PMS have direct effects on employees’ fairness perceptions. They also
have indirect effects on employees’ fairness perceptions through job-relevant
information. Hence, job-relevant information mediates the relationship
between comprehensive PMS and informational fairness. The mediation is
partial since the direct effect of comprehensive CPM on informational fair-
ness is significant. With respect to financial measures, these measures do not
engender job-relevant information. They also do not enhance employees’
perceptions of informational fairness.
This study’s findings and conclusions may have important practical and
theoretical implications. From a practical perspective, the findings and con-
clusions suggest that choice of performance evaluation criteria, specifically,


































comprehensive PMS vis-a-vis financial measures, may have profound
effects on employees’ reactions. Hence, the choice of performance measures
should not be approached solely from the organizational perspective, but
also from employee perspective as well. From a theoretical perspective, this
research contributes by informing the current debate on the performance
measures and performance measurement systems. The findings support a
strong association between comprehensive PMS and employees’ fairness
perceptions. The study also develops a more refined model to explain the
mechanism by which PMS influences employees’ fairness perceptions. It
approaches the research questions from an informational perspective by
addressing only the informational effects of performance measurement
systems and focusing only on job-relevant information as the intervening
variable, and informational fairness as the dependent variable. Such an
approach may be of importance to future management accounting
research on fairness issues. Colquitt (2001, p. 396) concludes as follows:
“Disagreement over the factor structure of organizational justice … have
hindered theoretical and practical advancement in the literature …. The
results suggest that organizational fairness is best conceptualized as …
distinct dimensions … Many have debated whether interactional justice
should be considered a subset of procedural fairness … the results suggests
that collapsing procedural fairness and interactional fairness together would
mask important differences … interactional fairness should be broken down
into its interpersonal and informational justice component as they too had
differential effects” (Emphasis added).
With respect to financial measures, it appears that the relationship
between this type of performance measures and job-relevant information
may not be significant. We evaluate this finding with those found in prior
studies, particularly with those from the different streams of research in the
budgeting literature. The first stream includes Hopwwod (1972) and Otley
(1978) which are the two of the earliest systematic studies in the budgeting
area. Both studies found that the use of financial measures for employee
performance evaluation in a rigid manner is associated with more dysfunc-
tional consequences (including high job-related tension and manipulation
of the budget) than when financial measures are used in a flexible manner.
These findings on the dysfunctional consequences of how financial measures
are used do not contradict the finding of our study that the use of financial
measures is not significantly related to the extent of job-relevant informa-
tion. Subsequent studies in budgeting, which attempted to reconcile the
findings of Hopwwod (1972), and (Otley, 1978) constitute another impor-
tant stream of research. These studies generally introduced contingent


































variables, the most important of which is the extent by which employees
participate in the target-setting process (budgetary participation). In gen-
eral, the results of studies which incorporated budgetary participation in
their model (e.g., Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Dunk, 1991; Brownell &
Hirst, 1986; Harrison, 1992; Lau, Low, & Eggleton, 1995) indicate that
budgetary participation may have significant effects on several employees’
outcomes. It is, however, important to note that the focus of these
studies is on the effects of budgetary participation, and not on the effects of
performance measures per se. Our study examines the effects of perfor-
mance measures per se, that is, whether the measures are financial or a
combination of financial and nonfinancial. The effects of budgetary partici-
pation are not examined in our study. Moreover, the dependent variables
of prior research on budgeting are generally job-related tension, job satis-
faction or job performance and not job-relevant information, the variable
in our model. A notable exception is Kren (1992, pp. 513514) who also
examines job-relevant information. However, similar to those studies which
incorporate budgetary participation in their models, Kren’s (1992) empha-
sis is also on the effects of budgetary participation. Specifically, his hypoth-
esis states that “participation increases job-relevant information”; and he
argues as follows: “Budgetary participation can … facilitate the acquisition
and use of JRI … Participation may … increase the manager’s attempts to
formulate accurate forecast …” (emphasis added). In other words, while
our study focuses on the effects of performance measures per se, that is,
whether the measures are financial or nonfinancial, prior research on budget-
ing including Kren (1992) has generally focused on budgetary participation,
that is, whether budgeting is participatory or imposed by top management.
Consequently, the results of our study are not contrary to those found in
the budgeting literature.
There are limitations associated with the study. While utmost care was
taken for a representative sample, bias, and other limitations associated
with the survey method may still be present. Moreover, as the sample was
derived from relatively large manufacturing organizations, the results may
not be generalizable to smaller size organizations and nonmanufacturing
sectors. The scope of our study is also limited to two employee outcomes. It
is likely that comprehensive PMS and financial measures may also affect
other employee outcomes. It may also be beneficial for future research
to consider other mediating variables (e.g., participation, role clarity, leader-
ship support) and other desirable employee outcomes from employees’
perspective (e.g., interpersonal trust, job satisfaction, involvement, and per-
formance). Our study investigates the effects of performance measurement


































systems on employees’ reactions. The focus is on the role of performance
measurement system in the communication of job-relevant information to
employees by the organization. Consequently, informational fairness is
selected as the appropriate dependent variable for investigation. However,
informational fairness is one of the several dimensions of organizational
fairness. Beside informational fairness, the organizational fairness literature
suggests that there are other dimensions of fairness including distributive
fairness, structural procedural fairness, and interpersonal fairness. As these
other fairness dimension are not included in our model but are also impor-
tant, opportunities exist for future research to also investigate how perfor-
mance measurement systems influence these other fairness constructs.
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned limitations, our study contributes
by informing the current debate on the roles and importance of performance
measurement systems with new evidence based on highly relevant but
previously unexplored variables and relationships.
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Comprehensive performance measurement systems
Performance measurement systems typically comprise methods of setting
business goals together with periodic feedback reports that indicate progress
against those goals. They focus on data  financial and nonfinancial
information that influences decision making and managers’ action. Please
indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the following
statements.
(1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
The performance measurement system provides a broad range of perfor-
mance information about different areas of my unit.
The performance measurement system is produced in a fully documen-
ted form, which provides a record for evaluating performance.
It provides a diverse set of measures related to the key performance
areas of my unit.
It provides consistent and mutually reinforcing links between the current
operating performance of my unit and the long-term strategies of the
organization.
The performance measurement system provides information on different
dimensions of my unit’s performance.
It links together the activities of my unit to the goals and objectives of
the organization.
It provides a variety of information about important aspects of my
unit’s operations.
It shows how the activities of my unit affect the activities of other units
within the organization.
The performance measurement system provides a range of measures that
cover the critical areas of my unit’s operation.
Financial performance measures
When your superior (your immediate boss) is evaluating your performance,
how much importance do you think he or she attaches to the following
items?
(1= never important, 7= always important)
My ability to meet my budget.
My ability to avoid unfavorable budget variances.
My ability to meet or better budgeted costs or sales.
My ability to achieve budgeted cost reductions or budgeted sales growth.
My ability to achieve financial targets.



































Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagreement with the follow-
ing statements.
(1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree)
I am always clear about what is necessary to perform well on my job.
I have adequate information to make optimal decisions to accomplish
my performance objectives.
I am able to obtain the strategic information necessary to evaluate
important decisions.
Informational fairness
The following items refer to your superior who enacted performance
evaluation procedures. To what extent …
(1= to a very little extent, 5= to a very great extent).
Has he/she been candid in his/her communication with you?
Has he/she explained the procedures thoroughly?
Has he/she communicated details in a timely manner?
Has he/she seemed to tailor his/her communication to individuals’ speci-
fic needs?
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